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Background
With the continuing increase of network information resources, users are confronted 
with urgent challenges such as how to make secure data sharing with others efficiently. 
To help users achieve secure and flexible data access control, Sahai and Waters (2005) 
proposed a new notion called attribute based encryption (ABE). In this cryptosystem, 
data receiver’s access privileges are described by a certain number of attributes. A data 
receiver can get access to the ciphertext only if the attributes he owns match with the 
access control policy set by the data owner. Equipped with the advantages of providing 
secure data protection as well as flexible access control, ABE (Goyal et al. 2006; Lewko 
et al. 2010; Waters 2011) has become an effective tool for secure data sharing between 
users.
However, the efficiency of current ABE schemes is still not high enough compared 
to traditional public key cryptosystem. One important factor is that encryption and 
decryption in ABE need frequent bilinear pairing calculations. Researchers have proved 
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that the computational complexity of bilinear pairing is much larger than that of other 
operations (exponential operation, multiplication, addition) in discrete group (Chen 
et al. 2007; Bertoni et al. 2005). In some special network systems such as wireless sen-
sor networks (Yu et  al. 2011) or body area networks (Hu and Zhang 2013; Tan et  al. 
2011), the computation capacity and energy resources of terminal devices are limited, 
frequent bilinear pairing operations may consume too much computing resources and 
lead to bottleneck or node failure during the process of data sharing. Consequently, to 
further enrich the application scenarios of ABE, it is essential to improve the efficiency 
by reducing the number of pairing operations. To the best of our knowledge, the elimi-
nation of pairing operation in attribute based cryptosystem is quite new in the research 
literature, which has not been solved yet.
Key exposure protection is another issue remains to be tackled in attribute based 
cryptosystem. Although many schemes have achieved forward and backward security 
in terms of attribute revocation (Hur 2013; Yu et al. 2010), however, the system is still at 
risk when key exposure happens. If the private key owned by a non-revoked user leaks, 
any user can use the private key to decrypt the corresponding ciphertext since the leaked 
private key is still a valid one. Consequently, all the potential threat calls for frequent 
key refreshing in attribute based cryptosystem. When key exposure happens, effective 
and efficient key updating mechanism should be implemented to keep the system from 
potential threat.
To better guarantee the security during the process of data sharing as well as minimize 
the total computation cost, in the paper, we do the following research:
We propose a high efficient key-insulated ABE scheme without pairings (KI-ABE-
WP). In our scheme, each user’s private key corresponds to an access structure. A user 
can decrypt the ciphertext only if the attributes used for encryption match with the 
access structure he owns. Besides, we divide the system lifetime into discrete time peri-
ods. When time period evolves, only part of the private key has to be updated and the 
system public parameters remain unchanged. This saves a lot of computation and trans-
mission load when attribute revocation or key exposure happens. What’s more, during 
the running of algorithms in our scheme, users and attribute authority (AA) needn’t do 
any bilinear pairing operations, which will increase the total efficiency to a large extent 
compared to current ABE schemes. At last, our scheme is proved to be secure under 
CDH hardness assumption. The high efficiency due to the elimination of bilinear pair-
ings makes our scheme more appropriate for secure data sharing in various network sys-
tems, especially those with limited computing capacity such as wireless sensor networks, 
mobile communication, etc.
The rest sections are arranged as follows:
In “Related works and preliminaries” section, we introduce the related works and 
essential mathematical preliminaries used to construct our scheme. The security model 
and concrete constructions of our scheme are proposed in “Models and assumptions” 
and “Constructions to our KI-ABE-WP” sections respectively. The security and perfor-
mance analysis are given in “Security proof and performance analysis” section. At last, 
we conclude our paper and make prospects on future directions in “Conclusion” section.
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Related works and preliminaries
Related works
Existing literatures have achieved much progress in ABE with respect to fine-grained 
access control (Goyal et al. 2006; Waters 2011; Bethencourt et al. 2007; Goyal et al. 2008), 
user flexible revocation (Hur and Noh 2011; Yu et al. 2011) and attribute based signcryp-
tion (Wang and Huang 2011), etc. Meanwhile, ABE has been widely designed for provid-
ing data protection in various network systems such as personal health record system (Li 
and Yu 2013), body area networks (Hu and Zhang 2013; Tan et al. 2011), wireless sensor 
networks (Yu et al. 2011), cloud computing (Yang et al. 2012). However, these schemes 
may not be entirely realistic to be applied to some application scenarios thanks to the 
heavy computation cost from bilinear pairing operations. Take the proposed scheme in 
Xhafa et al. (2015) for instance, if the number of attributes involved in encryption is n, 
then the decryption will take 4n times of pairing operations, which will bring a heavy 
computation burden on terminal devices. Consequently, to further improve the effi-
ciency and performance of ABE, the number of pairing operations should be reduced, 
even totally eliminated.
Besides efficiency, key exposure protection is another issue urgently to be solved in 
ABE. Many existing schemes have guaranteed forward and backward security when 
attribute revocation happens by introducing a proxy re-encryption server (Hur and 
Noh 2011; Yu et al. 2010). However, these schemes only focus on the key regeneration 
of the revoked users, but neglect the key updating for non-revoked users. If a non-
revoked user’s private key leaks, the confidentiality of the system will be threatened since 
the leaked private key is still a valid one. In fact, in attribute based cryptosystem, key 
refreshing is more important since either attribute revocation or private key exposure 
protection calls for frequent key-updating. Xu and Martin (2012) proposed an ABE 
scheme with secure key refreshing in, but their scheme has to regenerate the master 
key and public parameters in the system, this will bring about much more computation 
overheads when key updating happens. Key-insulation (Dodis et al. 2002) is a promising 
tool to guarantee forward and backward security as well as achieving high efficiency of 
key updating. In this mechanism, the lifetime of the system is divided into discrete peri-
ods. The public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime, while temporary secret 
keys are updated periodically. Key-insulation mechanism can provide full security when 
user’s private key exposure happens and it has been designed for effective key exposure 
protection in identity based cryptosystem (Zhu et al. 2014), certificateless cryptosystem 
(Chen et  al. 2015), etc. The advantage of key-insulation mechanism can also be com-
bined into attribute based cryptosystem and propose a key-insulated ABE scheme with 
efficient and secure key updating.
Hardness assumptions
(a) Discrete logarithm assumption (DL):
  Given X ,P ∈ G, it is computational infeasible to calculate the value of a 
(a ∈ Z∗q ) such that X  =  aP with a non-negligible probability within probabilistic 
polynomial-time.
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(b) Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption (CDH):
  For a, b ∈ Z∗q , given (p, ap, bp), it is computational infeasible to calculate the value of 
abp with a non-negligible probability within probabilistic polynomial-time.
Models and assumptions
A real world example of KI‑ABE‑WP
One typical application of our KI-ABE-WP is the mobile communication system, which 
can be illustrated in Fig. 1. It consists of six entitles: AA, key helper, base station, data 
centre, data sender and receiver. Base station and data centre are hardware architectures 
which are responsible for mobile communications and file storage. AA generates initial 
attribute private keys for each user in the system and the private key corresponds with 
an access structure. Data sender and receiver are the two sides of communication, data 
sender encrypts the file with a set of attributes, while a receiver can decrypt the cipher-
text if the attributes used for encryption match with the access structure he owns. When 
system evolves into a new time period, users in the system update their private keys to 
the latest version with the assistance of key helper. Due to the elimination of bilinear 
pairing operations, the proposed KI-ABE-WP will relieve the terminal devices from 
heavy computation burden, thus improving the efficiency and performance of the whole 
system.
Formalized definition of the algorithms in KI‑ABE‑WP
Our KI-ABE-WP consist of five algorithms:
Setup(1λ){PK, MK} This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs 

























Fig. 1 Apply KI-ABE-WP for mobile communication system
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Initial private key generation: {PK ,MK , γ ,TP0} → {TDγ ,TP0} This algorithm is oper-
ated by AA. It takes PK, MK, initial time period TP0 and the user’s access structure γ as 
input. The output of this algorithm is user’s initial private key TDγ ,TP0 .
Keyupdating : {PK ,MK , γ ,TPn} → {TDγ ,TPn} This algorithm is an interaction between 
AA and user. On input PK, MK, γ and the current time period TPn, AA outputs the 
key-updating component Uγ ,TPn and transfers it to users. User updates his temporal 
private key to the latest version using Uγ ,TPn .
Encrypt {PK ,M, {Ai}} → {CT } This algorithm is operated by the data sender. It takes 
PK, a plaintext M and an attribute set {Ai} as input and outputs the corresponding 
ciphertext CT.
Decrypt: {Di,γ ,CT } → {M} This algorithm is run by the data receiver. The algorithm 
takes as input the ciphertext CT and the receiver’s temporal private key TDγ ,TPn , it out-
puts the plaintext M.
Security model of KI‑ABE‑WP
Definition Our KI-ABE-WP scheme is secure under chosen ciphertext attacks if there 
exists an Adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game played by a 
Challenger and an Adversary.
Phase 1 Setup Challenger runs Setup procedure to obtain the system parameters PK 
and master keys MK. It sends PK to Adversary.
Phase 2 Queries Adversary can make the following queries to Challenger.
Initial private key generation query Challenger can obtain user’s initial private key 
Dγ ,TP0 by running Initial private key generation algorithm and returns the result back to 
Adversary.
Temporal private key generation query Challenger can obtain user’s temporal private 
key at the current time period and returns the result Dγ ,TPn back to Adversary.
Decrypt query Adversary can ask Decrypt query for ciphertext CT. Challenger runs 
Decrypt algorithm and returns the results to Adversary.
Phase 3 Challenge Adversary chooses two plaintexts M0 and M1 and a challenging 
access structure γ ∗ at current time period.
Challenger chooses σ ∈ {0, 1} randomly and calculates CTσ = Encrypt(PK, Mσ, {Ai}) and 
returns the result to Adversary.
Adversary outputs a value σ ∗ as a conjecture of σ.
During the whole process of the challenge game:
Adversary cannot ask Challenger for Decrypt query of M0 and M1.
Adversary cannot ask Challenger for Temporal private key generation query for the 
challenging structure γ ∗.
If σ ∗ = σ then Adversary wins the game.
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We denote Adv(A) =
∣∣∣Pr[σ ∗ = σ ] − 1
2





Let G to be a cyclic addition group. Denote q and p to be the prime order and generator 
of G respectively. AA defines a global attribute set {Ai} and picks ti ∈ Z∗q for each attrib-
ute in {Ai}. Let Ti =  tip to be the public key of Ai. Picks kn ∈ Z∗q for each time period 
TPn in the system lifetime. Let Kn = knp. Chooses a secret number y ∈ Z∗q and calculates 
Y = yp. Define two hash functions H1:{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2:{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m, m is the size of 





The system public parameters are {G, q, p,Ai,Ti,Kn,Y ,H1,H2} and the system master 
keys are {ti, y, kn}.
Initial private key generation
AA randomly chooses a polynomial qx for each node x in the user’s access tree γ. Denote 
dx to be the degree of qx and thrx to be the threshold value node. Let dx = thrx − 1. For 
the root node AA sets qroot(0) = y. For any other node (except for root node) in the 
access tree, let qx(0) = qindex(x)parent(x). The initial attribute private key at time period TP0 for 
access structure γ can be denoted by TDγ ,TP0 = {qx(0)+ ti + k0 ·H1(Ti,TP0), i ∈ γ }.
Key updating
When time period evolves from TPn to TPn+1, AA calculates the updated key compo-
nent Uγ ,TPn+1 = (kn+1 ·H1(Ti,TPn+1)− kn ·H1(Ti,TPn), i ∈ γ ) and transfers it to user. 
User calculates TDγ ,TPn+1 = TDγ ,TPn + Uγ ,TPn+1 as the temporal private key at time 
period TPn+1.
Encrypt
At time period TPn, for a plaintext M,data sender picks a random number s ∈ Z∗q and 
calculates:
Then data sender sends CT = {C1,C2,C3,C4} to data receiver.
Decrypt
Upon receiving CT, receiver calculates:
(1)
C1 = sp, C2 = sTi
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Correctness proof
If x is a leaf node, the calculation process is as follows:
All the value calculated from DecryptNode(x,TDγ ,TPn ,C1,C2,C3) will be stored as 
Fz. For any Fz ≠ 0,the algorithm calculates Froot (the value of root node) using Lagrange 
interpolation method.
If x is a non-leaf node, z is the child node of x, then the algorithm calculates the value 
of DecryptNode(x,TDγ ,TPn ,C1,C2,C3) as follows:
Let i = index(z), Sx′ = {index(z):z ∈ Sx}
Since the value of DecryptNode(x,TDi,TPn ,C1,C2,C3) = qx(0) · sp, whether x is a leaf 
node or non-leaf node, consequently, the value of root node Froot and the plaintext M can 
be calculated by:
Security proof and performance analysis
Security proof
Theorem If the proposed KI-ABE-WP can be broken by an Adversary in the random 
oracle model, then a Simulator can be constructed to break the CDH hardness assump-
tion in group G successfully with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof In the challenge game, if there exists an Adversary can break our KI-ABE-WP 
with an advantage (t, ɛ) in the random oracle model, then there exists a Simulator which 






= TDγ ,TPn · C1 − C2 − C3 ·H1(Ti,TPn)
= (qx(0)+ ti + kn ·H1(Ti,TPn)) · sp
− sTi − sKn ·H1(Ti,TPn) = qx(0) · sp+ ti · sp
+ kn ·H1(Ti,TP0) · sp− sTi − sKn ·H1(Ti,TPn)
























= qx(0) · sp
(5)
Froot = qroot(0) · sp = syp = sY
M = H2(Froot)⊕ C4 = H2(sY )⊕ C4
= H2(sY )H2(sY )M = M
(6)
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In the lemma (6), qp, qH1 , qi, qt , qd are the maximum numbers of Public key generation 
query, H1 query, Initial private key generation query, Temporal private key generation 
query and Decrypt query respectively. Denote tsm and ta to be the time consumption for 
running a scalar multiplication operation and an addition operation respectively.
The process of the challenge game is as follows:
Phase 1 Setup:
Challenger sets the parameters as follows:
Defines a global attribute set {Ai}. Let G be a cyclic addition group with prime order q. 
The generator of group G is denoted by p. Defines two hash functions: H1:{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , 
H2:{0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}m, m is the size of plaintext. Randomly picks a, b ∈ Z∗q , sets 
X = bp, Y = ap.
The aim of Simulator is to calculate the value of abp according to the process of 
the challenge game. Simulator plays the role of Challenger and runs Adversary as a 
sub-program.
Phase 2 Queries:
The proof skills used in our scheme resembles the method which has been proposed in 
Coron (2000). Without loss of generality, supposing that Adversary will make Public key 
generation query for an attribute Ai before making Initial private key generation query, 
Temporal private key generation query and Decrypt query to Simulator.
Then Adversary makes the following queries to Simulator:
Public key generation query: Simulator maintains a list Lp{Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti}. When Adver-
sary asks a Public key generation query for Ai in the γ. Simulator responds as follows:
Checks if Ai has already existed in the list Lp. If so, Simulator returns the result of 
Ti to Adversary. If not, Simulator picks a biased coin c ∈ {0, 1}l at random and sets 
Pr[c = 0] = θ while Pr[c = 1] = 1− θ. When c = 0, Simulator chooses ti ∈ Z∗q and sets 
Ti = tip. Otherwise let Ti = tiX. Simulator adds the tuple {Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti} into Lp and sends 
Ti to Adversary.
H1 query: Simulator maintains a list LH1{Ai, γ ,Ti,TPn,H1(Ti,TPn)}. When Adversary 
asks a H1 query for Ai, Simulator responds as follows:
Checks if Ai has already existed in LH1. If so, Simulator sends the result back to Adver-
sary. If not, Simulator calculates the value of H1(Ti, TPn) and adds it into the LH1 .
Initial private key generation query: Simulator maintains a list Li{Ai, γ ,TDγ ,TP0}. 
When Adversary asks a Initial private key generation query for γ, Simulator responds as 
follows:
Checks if γ exists in the list Lp{Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti}. If not, Simulator aborts the challenge 
game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E1.
Otherwise, Simulator randomly chooses a polynomial qx for each node x in the 
user’s access tree γ. Denote dx to be the degree of qx and thrx to be the threshold 
value node. Let dx = thrx − 1. For any other node (except for root node) in the access 
tree, let qx(0) = qindex(x)parent(x). Simulator chooses k0 ∈ Z∗q and sets initial private key 
TDγ ,TP0 = {qx(0)+ ti + k0 ·H1(Ti,TP0), i ∈ γ }. Then simulator adds the tuple into Li 
and sends TDγ ,TP0 to Adversary.
Temporalprivatekeygenerationquery:Simulator maintains a list 
Lt
{
Ai, γ ,TPn,TDγ ,TPn
}
 . When Adversary asks a Temporal private key generation query 
for γ, Simulator responds as follows:
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Checks γ in the list Li{Ai, γ ,TDγ ,TP0}. If γ does not exist in Li, Simulator aborts the 
challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E2.
Checks LH1{Ai, γ ,Ti,TPn,H1(Ti,TPn)}.. If the tuple {γ, Ai} does not exist in LH1, Simu-
lator aborts the challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E3.
Otherwise, Simulator randomly chooses kn ∈ Z∗q and calculates 
TDγ ,TPn = TDγ ,TP0 + (knH1(Ti,TPn)− k0 ·H1(Ti,TP0)). Simulator sends TDγ ,TPn to 
Adversary and adds the tuple into Lt{Ai, γ ,TPn,TDγ ,TPn}.
Decrypt query: Simulator maintains a list LD{Ai, γ, CT =  {C1, C2, C3, C4}, M}. When 
Adversary asks a Decrypt query for {Ai, γ, CT = {C1, C2, C3, C4}}, Simulator responds as 
follows:
Checks {Ai, γ} in the list Lp{Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti}. If c = 1, Simulator aborts the game and out-
puts failure. We denote this incident by E4.
Otherwise, Simulator recovers TDγ ,TPn from Lt{Ai, γ ,TPn,TDγ ,TPn} and calculates 
M = C4 ⊕H2
(∑
i∈γ TDγ ,TPn · C1 − C2 − C3 ·H1(Ti,TPn)
)
. Simulator sends the result 
to Adversary and adds the tuple into LD{Ai, γ, CT = {C1, C2, C3, C4}, M}.
Phase 3 Challenge:
Adversary outputs two plaintext M0 and M1 with a challenging access structure γ* at 
the current time period TPn.
Simulator checks if γ* exists in the list Lp{Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti}. If not, Simulator aborts the 
challenge game and outputs failure. We denote this incident by E5. If γ* exists in the list 
Lp{Ai, γ, c, ti, Ti} and c = 0, Simulator aborts the challenge game and outputs failure. We 
denote this incident by E6.
Simulator runs Temporal private key generation query for γ* and calculates 
TDγ ∗,TPn = (qx(0)+ ti + kn ·H1(Ti,TPn))
∗. Then, Simulator picks σ ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ Z∗q and 
calculates:
Simulator sends CTσ = {C1,σ, C2,σ, C3,σ, C4,σ} to Adversary.
Adversary outputs M∗σ as a guess of Mσ . If M∗σ = Mσ and Adversary wins the game, 




TDγ ∗,TPn · C1,σ − C2,σ − C3,σ ·H1(Ti,TPn)
)
 as the 
solution to CDH assumption in group G.
Then we will analyse the time complexity of Simulator in breaking CDH assumption in 
group G.
From the description, assuming the average number of attributes involved is “n”, for 
each request of Public key generation query, Initial Private key generation query, Tem-
poral private key generation query and Decrypt query, Simulator has to run n times of 
multiplication operation, n times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition 
operation, n times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation, 2n 
times of multiplication operation and 2n times of addition operation respectively.
During the Challenge phase, Simulator has to run (3n  +  4) times of multiplication 
operation and 2n times of addition operation.
(7)
C1,σ = s · X , C2,σ = s · tiX
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Denote tsm, ta to be the time consumption of scalar multiplication operation and addi-
tion operation in group G respectively. From what has been discussed above, the total 
time complexity of Simulator t′ satisfies:
Next we will discuss the advantage of Simulator in breaking the CDH assumption.
During the process of the challenge game, the responses of Initial Private key genera-
tion query, Temporal private key generation query and Decrypt query return to Adversary 
are valid and indistinguishable if E1, E2, E3, E4 do not happen. Furthermore, if Adver-
sary succeeds in distinguishing Mσ and E5, E6 do not happen, then Simulator is capable 
of breaking the CDH assumption.
Next we will calculate the probability of the incidents discussed above.
According to the process of queries phase, the probability of E4 and E6 not occurring 
can be denoted by lemma (9):
The value of Pr
∣∣E4 ∩ E6∣∣ is maximized in lemma (10) when θ = qd
1+qd
.
Since the responses of Public key generation query act as random oracle model, conse-
quently, the probability of E1 and E5 not occurring can be denoted by lemma (11):
Likewisely, the probability of E2 and E3 not occurring can be denoted by lemma (12):
Taking all the probabilities of the above incidents into account, it can be figured out 
that if Adversary successfully attacks our scheme with an advantage ɛ, then a Simulator 
can break the CDH assumption in group G with an advantage of ɛ′ which satisfies:
Secure and efficient key updating
Our scheme achieves both secure and efficient key updating. According to the Keyup-
dating algorithm, the updated key component for attribute Ai at time period TPn+1 is 
calculated as Uγ ,TPn+1 = (kn+1 ·H1(Ti,TPn+1)− kn ·H1(Ti,TPn), i ∈ γ ). Since a user 
cannot obtain the value of kn+1, kn, it is computational infeasible for him to calculate the 
value of Uγ ,TPn+1 and update his private keys. Without loss of generality, when a user’s 
private key TDγ ,TPn was leaked during the time period TPn, the system still maintains 
safe after TPn since all the private keys have been securely updated.
With respect to the computation cost, key updating for a single attribute at a dis-
crete period only needs one multiplication operation, one addition operation and 1 H1 








· tsm + n(2qi + 2qt + 2qd + 2) · ta
(9)Pr
∣∣E4 ∩ E6∣∣ = θqd · (1− θ)
(10)Prmax
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operation. Besides, the system parameters remain unchanged throughout different time 
periods and this will reduce more the communication overheads.
Performance analysis
In this paper, assuming that the number of attributes involved in encryption is n, according 
to the algorithms discussed above, the Encrypt algorithm will take (n + 3) times of multi-
plication operations, one addition operation and one H2 operation, while the Decrypt algo-
rithm will take 2n times of multiplication operations, 2n times of addition operations and 1 
H2 operation. Detailed computation costs of each algorithm is listed in Table 1.
From Table 1, it can be seen that the total computation efficiency is much higher in 
our scheme compared to current ABE schemes since bilinear pairing operations have 
been totally eliminated.
Conclusion
In this paper, we combine the advantage of key-insulation mechanism with ABE and 
propose a high efficient key-insulated ABE algorithm without pairings (KI-ABE-WP). 
During the running of algorithms in our scheme, users and AA needn’t run any bilin-
ear pairing operations. The high efficiency and proved security make our scheme more 
appropriate for data sharing in network systems, especially those with limited comput-
ing capacity such as wireless sensor networks, mobile communication system, etc.
Our future research should focus on the ABS (attribute based signature) without pair-
ing operations, which provides secure data authentication with higher efficiency than 
current ABS schemes.
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Table 1 Computation cost of algorithms in our scheme
Algorithms Setup Initial private  
key generation
Encrypt Decrypt Key updating
Multiplication n + 1 n n + 3 2n n
Addition 0 2n 1 2n n
Hash 1 0 n 0 0 n
Hash 2 0 0 1 1 0
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